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Democracy and Empire, The Athenian Invasion of Sicily, 415-413 BCE

Alexander O. Boulton

Introduction:

Athens was at the height of its power when it decided to invade Sicily in 415 BCE.(1) The conquest of Sicily, if it had been successful, might have made Athens the victor in its long war against its enemy, Sparta. It could have cut off Sparta’s access to the grain and timber that they imported from the great island in the center of the Mediterranean, and it could have been the first step in Athens’ domination of Carthage, Italy, and the Iberian Peninsula. Three hundred years later, the conquest of Sicily would initiate Rome’s subjugation of virtually all the lands surrounding the Mediterranean. And, 2,400 years later, the invasion of Sicily by the Allied Powers during World War II, would be the beginning of the end of the Axis powers. In those cases, the occupation of Sicily initiated two of the greatest epochs in the history of humankind with unprecedented levels of material prosperity, political stability, peace, and artistic and intellectual creativity.

This could have been Athens’ destiny. The result of the Athenian campaign, however, was one of the most catastrophic defeats in military history. It was the tipping point in Athens’ war against Sparta, which led ultimately to Sparta’s victory and the end of the Athenian Empire. This was one of the great turning points in history, whose long-lasting consequences continue to shape who we are and how we think nearly two and a half millennia later.

The story of this tragic event was first told by the Greek historian Thucydides, who was one of Athens’s foremost generals in the war. Unfortunately for Thucydides, he failed to prevent Spartan forces from taking an important Athenian outpost in the war, and the Athenian Assembly punished him for this failure by removing him from command and exiling him from Athens. Fortunately for us, this gave Thucydides time to write his great history of the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE), named after the large Peloponnesian peninsula at the southernmost tip of mainland Greece and the home of Sparta.

Also, fortunately for us, Thucydides spent much of his time in exile behind enemy lines with the Spartan forces. From this unique perspective on the war, Thucydides crafted one of the first, and one of the greatest, historical narratives ever written. His history of the war is the principal source for this retelling of the story of the Sicilian campaign.

My original intention in writing this book was solely to describe the Sicilian Campaign, which I believe is the most important turning point in the war between Athens and Sparta. It is also an exciting story of remarkable personalities and dramatic events. As I wrote and revised this work, however, it became clear that this story could not be told without also considering the complex relationship between the Athenian democracy and the Athenian Empire.

Thucydides gives us the first and the best description of the workings of the world’s first democracy. The Athenian ideas that common citizens can make their own laws, that citizens hold the rights of free speech and equality before the law, and that government serves the interests of all its many people without favoring the few who are rich, were all ideas unknown in the world before his time.

Moreover, for many people, including many of America’s Founders, Thucydides’ story of Athens’ failure in the Peloponnesian War and the collapse of its empire is proof of the weakness of a democratic system of government. For them, the Athenian democracy was the cause of the demise of its empire.

 Nearly 2,500 years later, we might believe that we see parallels between our situation today and the collapse of the Athenian Empire or the decline and fall of the Roman Empire 1,000 years later. But history is not solely a story of tragic declines and falls. It is also a story of growth and rejuvenation, and one might seem like the other to those who are in the midst of experiencing them.

Thucydides is a wise guide to many of these issues. He has been praised throughout the centuries for his realistic depiction of events and for his objectivity. He saw how the actions and motives of individuals often had great unforeseen consequences, and he saw how small details shaped larger historical patterns. He wrote his narrative of the war between the Athenians and the Spartans during one of the most remarkable periods in human history. Many people who lived in Thucydides’ home of Athens and its neighboring territories were beginning to see the world with eyes newly opened. A veil of superstition, of oracles, and of prophecies was slowly being lifted. During most of humankind’s history, the physical world and a supernatural realm seemed to coexist without borders. Spiritual forces swirled around, flowing in and out of the material world, and minds perceived things beyond the powers of eyes and ears. Thucydides was one of the first to exclude supernatural forces from his observation of the world in much the same way that we do today. The story of the Sicilian campaign is, thus, many stories, both dark and brilliant, and we can choose one, or we can imagine another, which is more relevant to each of us.

Admittedly, the story of the Sicilian campaign and the Peloponnesian War is not very well known. For most people who have heard of it, it is a story of a long-dead people in a far-away land in an inconsequential war. Part of the blame for this rests with Thucydides himself. As important as his history is, in many places, it is a very dry and boring catalog of places and events which have little clear significance to anyone but the most pedantic scholar. Thucydides admits early on in his book that his goal was not to appeal to everyone. He set out to write about the war as accurately as possible, “as a possession for all time,” without any romance or poetry, and purposefully not “to win the applause of the moment.” Evidence of his disregard for popular approval is seen in his writing style, which is, according to one of his admirers, “complex,” “convoluted,” “idiosyncratic,” and “obscure.” (3)

The awkward style and structure of Thucydides’ narrative is partly the result of the conditions of its composition. Thucydides began to write his history near the beginning of the war and continued to write while the war was going on. In most cases, he had no idea as he wrote which events would have a greater or lesser impact on subsequent events, which events he should highlight in his narrative, and which events he should pass over quickly. If he had more time to revise his work, perhaps, it would have been very different.

In addition to all this, Thucydides often assumes that his readers are familiar with the geography of ancient Greece. Who knows today where Amphipolis, Thrace, or Euboea are? — or the thousands of other places that Thucydides names? Often modern historians have only contributed to these problems, themselves getting lost in all the minutia of details, losing sight of the larger picture, and filling voids in Thucydides’ narrative with sometimes dubious conjectures.(4)

A close reader of Thucydides’ text, however, is likely to be rewarded for the effort. Thucydides’ history is a complex tapestry of events in which he tells many overlapping stories simultaneously. Its various threads weave in and out, in a complex and often awe-inspiring pattern. This is often confusing, but it is also part of what gives his history such power. A reader can become emotionally and intellectually engaged as the work unfolds, and as the reader sorts out the many narratives to find meanings in the myriad assortment of details. Much like real life itself.

For those of us who do not have the time to engage with all these issues, this book simplifies Thucydides’ monumental history by describing a single, narrowly-focused event in Thucydides’ history—the Athenian invasion of Sicily. This was the pivotal event in Thucydides’ history, and, as I believe, the single most decisive event in the history of ancient Greece. Critics can argue that the result is a brutal surgery of Thucydides’ text, since it leaves out many important events, and dismisses many of the themes that make his book still relevant two millennia later. These criticisms, of course, are appropriate. If this work, however, inspires readers to discover the work of Thucydides on their own, or to delve further into the history of ancient Greece, or stimulates thinking about the interrelated natures of democracy and empire, then some of the purpose of this book will have been accomplished.